Clyde R. McCormick represented nine members of a cooperative in a dispute relating to their ability to drive taxis. Prior to a hearing on an application for a temporary injunction, McCormick negotiated a partial settlement with Star Cab that enabled five of the members, excluding the Appellants, to continue driving taxis. After hiring new counsel, trying their case and losing, and being sanctioned for bringing frivolous claims, the clients who did not benefit from the settlement sued McCormick, alleging that McCormick breached his duty to them by failing to withdraw from representation pursuant to Rule 1.06 of the Texas disciplinary rules when the partial settlement resulted in an alleged conflict of interest among the nine members. In Lajzerowicz v. McCormick, No. 04-05-00681-CV, 2006 Tex. App. Lexis 8744 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Oct. 11, 2006), the San Antonio Court of Appeals rejected the claims because a mere violation of the disciplinary rules does not give rise to a private cause of action:

A cause of action arising out of bad legal advice or improper representation is legal malpractice. Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer, 943 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, writ denied). A legal malpractice claim is based on negligence. Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tex. 1989). Texas does not permit a plaintiff to fracture legal malpractice claims into several causes of action. Aiken v. Hancock, 115 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2003, pet. denied). A plaintiff also is not permitted to recast a negligence claim as a DTPA claim. Ballesteros v. Jones, 985 S.W.2d 485, 498 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). A claim based upon the improper representation of a client or upon the failure of an attorney to exercise the degree of care and diligence that a lawyer would commonly exercise, despite its labeling, is a malpractice claim. Aiken, 115 S.W.3d at 28-29; Kahlig v. Boyd, 980 S.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The disciplinary rules of the State Bar do not give rise to a private cause of action and, therefore, are not enforceable through a legal malpractice claim. See, e.g., Jones v. Blume, 196 S.W.3d 440, 450 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2006, no pet.); Judwin Properties, Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, P.C., 981 S.W.2d 868, 869-70 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), pet. denied, 11 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. 2000); Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 474, 479 (Tex. App.–El Paso 1989, writ denied); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

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The DTPA claim simply alleges that by failing to withdraw, McCormick acted unconscionably by continuing to represent the Appellants. Even the affidavits the Appellants submitted in an effort to defeat summary judgment turn on the assertion that McCormick was required to withdraw pursuant to the disciplinary rules. Because a violation of the disciplinary rules does not give rise to a private cause of action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment with regard to the Appellants' legal malpractice claims, including the claim the Appellants attempted to recast as a DTPA claim.